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A
T
O
W
I 
I. INTRODUCTION (THE SITUATION) 
 
 
  NATO warship is in transit near Subi Reef, a low-tide elevation (LTE)1 
that features an artificial installation, built and occupied by the People’s Re-
public of China (PRC).2 Subi Reef is in the vicinity of Thitu Island, a rock3 
that also contains a Philippines-occupied feature.4 The NATO warship has 
a short “tail,” an antisubmarine warfare towed sonar array, deployed in the 
water and trailing the vessel. 
A flotilla of Chinese fishing vessels, apparently operating in concert, ma-
neuver to impede the transit of the warship, which at this time is located less 
than ten nautical miles from Subi Reef, and approximately fourteen nautical 
miles from Thitu Island. Radio transmissions from the fishing vessels indi-
cate that they are under the direction of a China Coast Guard (CCG) cutter 
six nautical miles distant. Several fishing vessels stop in front of the warship, 
while others steam towards the warship on a constant bearing, decreasing 
range course. 
Among the fishing vessels is a large steel hull PRC fishing vessel (alt-
hough no nets or fishing gear are visible). While the smaller vessels are har-
assing the warship in close proximity, this large vessel stands off at three 
thousand yards. It transmits a message via Channel 16 bridge-to-bridge: 
“This is Chinese territorial waters. You don’t have permission to be here. 
You must leave now.” 
The warship continues along its mean line of advance, although it adopts 
a zigzag pattern in response to the maneuvering of the fishing vessel, with a 
view to keeping as much water between it and those vessels. The warship 
also increases its readiness and watertight integrity states. 
                                                                                                                      
1. South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013-19, PCA Case Reposi-
tory, Award, ¶ 368 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016), https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2086 
[hereinafter South China Sea Arbitration Award]. For elements of the Chinese response, see 
The South China Sea Arbitration Awards: A Critical Study, 17 CHINESE JOURNAL OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 207, 520–51, ¶¶ 645–721 (2018) (discussing LTEs); id. at 594–607, ¶¶ 827–57 
(discussing Chinese maritime law enforcement activities directed at Philippine vessels). 
2. Subi Reef, ASIA MARITIME TRANSPARENCY INSTITUTE, https://amti.csis.org/subi-
reef/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2020) (noting that China first took possession of the feature in 
1988 and providing overhead images of its subsequent development). 
3. South China Sea Arbitration Award, supra note 1, ¶ 622. 
4. Thitu Island, ASIA MARITIME TRANSPARENCY INSTITUTE, https://amti.csis.org/ 
thitu-island/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2020) (noting that Thitu Island is a rock near the Spratly 
Islands and the Philippines first took possession of the feature in 1974). 
 
 
 
An Incident in the South China Sea Vol. 96 
507 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Within minutes, the warship receives a further transmission apparently 
from the CCG cutter: “You are not in innocent passage. You do not have 
PRC permission to be here. You must leave the area immediately.” The war-
ship responds that it is exercising its freedom of navigation under interna-
tional law.5 The CCG cutter than transmits a further message: “If you do not 
leave our waters, we will use force. The consequences will be yours.”6 By this 
stage, the warship is still within ten nautical miles of Subi Reef but has closed 
to a range of thirteen nautical miles from Thitu.7 
The regular fishing vessels maneuvering at the warship’s quarters now 
proceed to cross close astern and snag the warship’s tail.8 Crewmembers on 
one of these fishing vessels visibly haul in a bight of the tail and hack through 
                                                                                                                      
5. For the Chinese reaction to a warship’s passage through a claimed territorial sea while 
exercising the freedom of navigation, see British Navy’s HMS Albion Warned over South China 
Sea “Provocation,” BBC (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-45433153. 
6. For a case analyzing the threat of the use of force in a maritime incident, see Guyana 
vs. Suriname, Case No. 2004-04, PCA Case Repository, Award (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2007), 
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/902:‘439. For the Tribunal’s discussion of the 
threat or use of force in this case, see id. ¶¶ 425–40. With regard to the demand made of the 
Guyanese rig to leave the area, the Tribunal stated, 
The testimony of those involved in the incident clearly reveals that the rig was ordered to 
leave the area and if this demand was not fulfilled, responsibility for unspecified conse-
quences would be theirs. There was no unanimity as to what these ‘consequences’ might 
have been. The Tribunal is of the view that the order given by Major Jones to the rig con-
stituted an explicit threat that force might be used if the order was not complied with. 
Id. ¶ 439. The Tribunal continued, 
The Tribunal accepts the argument that in international law force may be used in law en-
forcement activities provided that such force is unavoidable, reasonable and necessary. 
However in the circumstances of the present case, this Tribunal is of the view that the action 
mounted by Suriname on 3 June 2000 seemed more akin to a threat of military action rather 
than a mere law enforcement activity. This Tribunal has based this finding primarily on the 
testimony of witnesses to the incident . . . .  Suriname’s action therefore constituted a threat 
of the use of force in contravention of the Convention, the UN Charter and general inter-
national law. 
Id. ¶ 445. 
7. These distances are not geographically precise; they are for the purposes of the sce-
nario only. 
8. For a discussion of the 2009 USNS Impeccable incident involving a U.S. Military Sealift 
Command vessel and three 2011–12 cable cutting incidents involving Vietnam-licensed sur-
vey vessels and PRC vessels, see Michael Green et al., Counter-Coercion Series: Harassment of the 
USNS Impeccable, ASIA MARITIME TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (May 9, 2017), 
https://amti.csis.org/counter-co-harassment-usns-impeccable/; see also Raul Pedrozo, Close 
Encounters at Sea: The USNS Impeccable Incident,  62 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, Sum-
mer 2009, at 99, 101; China Accuses Vietnam in South China Sea Row, BBC (June 10, 2011), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/ world-asia-pacific-13723443. 
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it. The fishers gather in the separated part of the tail and coil it on the deck 
of the fishing vessel. 
Simultaneously, the large steel-hulled fishing vessel closes at high speed 
on a collision course. The warship maneuvers away, but the large fishing 
vessel collides with the warship abaft the beam,9 causing significant damage 
to the guardrails, gunwales, superstructure, and a rigid-hulled inflatable boat 
and launch derrick, and injuries to several crewmembers. The impact holes 
the hull well above the waterline. 
 
II. ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY 
 
The following assessment focuses on the law of the sea framework, with a 
brief reference to some associated responsibility matters. The scenario also 
clearly raises a raft of other legal questions: When does use of force, osten-
sibly for a maritime law enforcement purpose, cross the line into U.N. Char-
ter Article 2(4)10 territory. What factors and indicia do we use to determine 
this point? Does the legitimacy or otherwise of the claim or right purportedly 
being enforced alter this assessment? Where both the target and perpetrator 
vessel are State vessels, when does a use of force for maritime security pur-
poses approach the quite low 1949 Geneva Conventions Common Article 2 
threshold for an international armed conflict?11 
The aim of this assessment, however, is to deal more narrowly with law 
of the sea characterization issues; consequently, these other highly relevant, 
but—in legal terms—more diversely referenced aspects of the scenario have 
been set aside. This assessment of this scenario, therefore, proceeds along 
the following iterative line. First, where, in law of the sea terms, did the inci-
dent happen? Second, who, employing a law of the sea characterization 
scheme (but referencing relevant responsibility regimes where necessary) 
                                                                                                                      
9. For a discussion of the Black Sea bumping incident involving collisions between U.S. 
and Soviet naval vessels following a warning from the Soviet vessels not to violate the 
U.S.S.R. border, see John Rolph, Freedom of Navigation and the Black Sea Bumping Incident: How 
Innocent Must Innocent Passage Be, 135 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 137 (1992); William Aceves, 
Diplomacy at Sea: US Freedom of Navigation Operations in the Black Sea, 46 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 
REVIEW, Spring 1993, at 59, 59; John Hitt, Oceans Law and Superpower Relations: The Bumping 
of the Yorktown and the Caron in the Black Sea, 29 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 713 (1989). 
10. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
11. See, e.g., Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31. 
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were the perpetrator vessels? Third, where does responsibility for their con-
duct lay? And finally, how do the where and who factors interact in assessing 
the incident, and some associated responsibilities, by reference to the law of 
the sea? 
 
A. The Location of the Incident 
 
The first question is to ascertain where the incident(s) occurred in terms of 
the scheme of maritime zones and passage regimes set out in the 1982 United 
Nations Law on the Sea Convention (UNCLOS)12 and as reflected in cus-
tomary international law.13 In particular, it is essential to determine whether 
the incident(s) occurred: 
 
1. Within twelve nautical miles of a rock (which generates a territorial 
sea),14 or 
2. Within twelve nautical miles of a LTE that is itself within twelve nau-
tical miles of a rock (and thus can potentially—although this is con-
tested—extend the territorial sea attaching to the rock),15 or 
3. Outside twelve nautical miles from any territorial sea generating or 
extending feature (meaning that the waters in question are—for pur-
poses of navigation—simply high seas). 
 
Any analysis of this question would need to pay close attention to the 
baselines that may legitimately be claimed around any territorial sea generat-
ing feature (rocks, in this scenario). Moreover, the capacity of a LTE that lies 
within twelve nautical miles of these baselines to extend a territorial sea must 
be assessed. There is some debate as to whether these “parasitic LTEs” op-
erate in this way from mere rocks or only from fully entitled islands.16 In the 
                                                                                                                      
12. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
13. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics-United States: Joint Statement With Attached 
Uniform Interpretation of Rules of International Law Governing Innocent Passage, U.S.-
U.S.S.R., Sept. 23, 1989, 28 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1444 (1989). 
14. UNCLOS, supra note 12, art. 121(3). 
15. Id. art. 13. The Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration case appears to take the 
position that LTEs can operate in this way in relation to the territorial seas of rocks. See infra 
note 16. 
16. See, e.g., James Kraska & Raul “Pete” Pedrozo, Can’t Anybody Play This Game? US 
FON Operations and Law of the Sea, LAWFARE (Nov. 17, 2015), https://www. lawfare-
blog.com/cant-anybody-play-game-us-fon-operations-and-law-sea. By contrast, the South 
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scenario, the analysis will assume that a rock’s territorial seas may also benefit 
from the effect of a parasitic LTE. 
The law of the sea anticipates that the baselines of rocks and islands may, 
in fact, be some way out from a rock by virtue of the existence of, for exam-
ple, a fringing reef.17 Such features can serve to push the baselines—and thus 
the outer limit of the territorial sea—quite some distance from the rock itself. 
Thus, the use of the low water mark of the rock simpliciter on the one hand, 
or of the fringing reef on the other, could make a considerable difference as 
to whether a vessel located more than twelve nautical miles from the geo-
graphic rock is actually less than twelve nautical miles from the fringing reef 
baseline around the feature as a whole, and falls within the territorial sea as 
a result. 
As noted above, this analysis could also have significant implications for 
whether a nearby LTE is ultimately situated within twelve nautical miles of 
the generating feature’s baselines (thus radically extending that feature’s ter-
ritorial sea), or is located more than twelve nautical miles from the parent 
feature’s baselines, in which case it does not affect the territorial sea’s outer 
limit for the generating feature. Of relevance for this scenario, the South China 
Sea Arbitration award observes, 
 
A more complex question, however, is whether Subi Reef lies within 12 
nautical miles of a high-tide feature, such that it would could [sic] serve as 
a baseline for the territorial sea of that high-tide feature pursuant to Article 
13(1) of the Convention. Subi Reef lies slightly more than 12 nautical miles 
from the baseline of Thitu Island, and would not qualify for the purposes 
of Article 13(1) for a territorial sea drawn from Thitu Island itself. The 1867 
fair chart of the Thitu Reefs, however, clearly depicts a high-water ‘Sandy 
Cay’ on the reefs to the west of Thitu Island. This feature—provided that 
it, in fact, exists—would lie within 12 nautical miles of Subi Reef, which 
would be permitted by Article 13(1) to serve as a baseline for the territorial 
sea drawn from Sandy Cay.18 
 
Nevertheless, if the Thitu baselines were redrawn and extended by some 
means (or considered as integrated with those of Sandy Cay),19 there is some 
                                                                                                                      
China Sea arbitral panel appeared to accept that parasitic LTEs can operate upon the terri-
torial seas of rocks. South China Sea Arbitration Award, supra note 1, ¶ 373. 
17. UNCLOS, supra note 12, art. 6. 
18. South China Sea Arbitration Award, supra note 1, ¶ 369. 
19. The baselines currently claimed in this area appear to be based in part on an 1867 
British survey. South China Sea Arbitration Award, supra note 1, ¶ 371; see also id. ¶ 384 
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potential that Subi Reef might operate as a parasitic LTE by reference to 
either the proximity of Sandy Cay (which is also dry at high tide and is thus 
classifiable as a rock20) and Thitu Island (or both). As one commentator 
notes, 
 
Subi was a low-tide elevation before China built an artificial island on it. As 
such, it does not generate its own territorial sea but could bump out the 
territorial sea of at least one of the unoccupied sand cays, which is dry at 
high tide and located less than 12 nautical miles from it. So it could be 
claimed that these ships are all operating within the territorial sea of both 
Thitu and the sand cay(s) with which Subi is associated.21 
 
Indeed, as the South China Sea Arbitration award notes, 
 
As Subi Reef lies within 12 nautical miles of the reef on which Sandy Cay 
is located, it could serve as a basepoint for the territorial sea of Sandy Cay. 
The Tribunal also notes, however, that even without a high-tide feature in 
the location of Sandy Cay, Subi Reef would fall within the territorial sea of 
Thitu as extended by basepoints on the low-tide elevations of the reefs to 
the west of the island. Accordingly, the significance of Sandy Cay for the 
status of Subi Reef is minimal.22  
 
Thus, even though Subi is by one estimate just more than twelve nautical 
miles from Thitu, either (i) different baselines for Thitu, (ii) the presence of 
Sandy Cay as a link between Thitu and Subi (dependent on shared sover-
eignty), or (iii) the independent operation of Sandy Cay upon Subi, all create 
the potential for a territorial sea upon which Subi, an LTE, might have ex-
tension effects. And while Sandy Cay currently has no permanent presence, 
both the Philippines and the PRC (and other States) claim this feature. As 
Valencia concludes, “Subi also lies within the 12nm territorial sea of Sandy 
Cay. Both China and the Philippines claim these sandbars outright as their 
                                                                                                                      
(“Subi Reef lies within 12 nautical miles of the high-tide feature of Sandy Cay on the reefs 
to the west of Thitu.”). 
20. South China Sea Arbitration Award, supra note 1, ¶¶ 372–73. 
21. Confirming the Chinese Flotilla Near Thitu Island, ASIA MARITIME TRANSPARENCY IN-
STITUTE (Aug. 17, 2017), https://amti.csis.org/confirming-chinese-flotilla-near-thitu-is-
land/. 
22. South China Sea Arbitration Award, supra note 1, ¶ 373. 
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sovereign territory and indirectly because they are situated within Thitu’s ter-
ritorial sea.”23 
It follows that the first steps in untangling this scenario from a legal per-
spective are: (i) look at the chart; (ii) allocate feature status (LTE, rock, is-
land); (iii) come to a conclusion on baselines; (iv) assess the geographic 
scope—in principle—of any potentially claimable territorial sea; and (v) 
check whether the warship is, or was, within that potential territorial sea. 
 
1. If There Is a Potential Territorial Sea in Play 
 
If it is determined that there is, potentially, a territorial sea issue in play, then 
further consideration is necessary as to another preliminary and more nor-
mative question regarding whether that territorial sea is juridically valid and 
thus must be recognized. 
This question to some extent hinges on the interpretive approach of the 
warship’s State as to whether a recognized (by that warship’s State) allocation 
of sovereignty over the rock is a precondition to the existence (as far as that 
warship’s State is concerned) of any territorial sea around that rock. That is, 
if sovereignty over the territorial sea generating feature, for example, the 
Thitu rock, is unsettled and no specific sovereign (neither the Philippines, 
which physically occupies the rock, nor Vietnam or the PRC that also claim 
the rock24) is recognized by the warship’s State, is there still a territorial sea 
around that feature? 25 
Here, there are two options. The first option is to recognize that the 
feature generates a territorial sea, and, although the warship’s State is not 
able to say which State is sovereign over that territorial sea, a territorial sea 
nevertheless exists as a legal fact. Therefore, that territorial sea (and by im-
plication the undetermined sovereign’s claim to it) ought to be respected.26 
                                                                                                                      
23. Mark Valencia, The Standoff at Sandy Cay in the South China Sea, EASTASIAFORUM, 
(May 24, 2019), https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/05/24/the-standoff-at-sandy-cay-
in-the-south-china-sea/. 
24. RAUL (PETE) PEDROZO, CNA, CHINA VERSUS VIETNAM: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
COMPETING CLAIMS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA (2014), https://www.cna.org/cna_files/ 
pdf/iop-2014-u-008433.pdf. 
25. Noting the inescapable linkage between sovereignty and territory implicit in UN-
CLOS. See UNCLOS, supra note 12, art. 2. 
26. For example, an argument to this effect might cite the maxim that the land domi-
nates the sea and that the geographic fact of land—not the question of who owns the land—
creates the legal fact of a territorial sea. See also Lea Brilmayer & Natalie Klein, Land and Sea: 
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The second option is to assert that a territorial sea must be “claimed”27 as 
opposed to merely claimable to be valid. That is, there is no automaticity to 
the existence of a territorial sea around a potential territorial sea generating 
feature. Under this approach, either the inability to identify the necessary 
linkage to a sovereign, or the indeterminacy between competing claims,28 for 
example, as between the PRC and the Philippines, would render the exist-
ence of any territorial sea juridically inchoate and thus deniable. 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
Two Sovereignty Regimes in Search of a Common Denominator, 33 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOUR-
NAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 703, 716 (2001) 
The substantive law for allocation of maritime spaces is very different from the substantive 
law for allocation of land territory. Sir Robert Jennings contrasted ownership of land and 
maritime areas by saying that maritime spaces are allocated according to ‘certain a priori 
legal principles,’ while disputes over land boundaries are settled by consulting ‘the juridical 
and geographical history of the particular boundary in question,’ especially with regard to 
physical occupation. 
27. UNCLOS, supra note 12, art. 2 
1. The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters 
and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, 
described as the territorial sea. 
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and 
subsoil. 
3. The sovereignty over the territorial sea is exercised subject to this Convention and to 
other rules of international law. 
See also Kraska & Pedrozo, supra note 16 (“UNCLOS Article 3 allows States to ‘establish’ a 
territorial sea – it is not automatic. Neither China nor any other claimant has established a 
territorial sea around a feature in the Spratly Islands. The law of the sea requires affirmative 
action by a sovereign state . . . .”). 
28. Kraska & Pedrozo, supra note 16 (“[I]in order for a rock to generate a territorial sea 
it must be under the sovereignty of a coastal state. The United States does not recognize 
any country as having sovereignty over the [Spratly Islands] features occupied or claimed by 
China . . . .”). As O’Connell observed, “the idea that a State does not have a territorial sea 
unless it proclaims it, is difficult to reconcile with the doctrine of the inherency of the con-
tinental shelf.” 1 D. P. O’CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 52 (Ivan A. 
Shearer ed., 1982). However, the assumption underpinning O’Connell’s point is that there 
is a recognized sovereign in the first place. Indeed, O’Connell’s observation that under the 
“police” theory of the territorial sea, there is “no alternative solution to that of sovereignty 
as the explanation of’ territorial sea rights,” implies that the absence of a sovereign could 
obviate the legal requirement to respect a claimed territorial sea. Id. at 62. As O’Connell 
continues, in describing the “sovereignty theory” of the territorial sea, he states, “The pred-
atory instincts of States could only be satisfied in the concept of sovereignty, for where 
sovereignty was lacking there was doubt about the State’s authority to appropriate to itself 
the riches of the coastal sea, and to legislate effectively for foreign ships . . . .” Id. at 710. 
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2. Consequences for Passage 
 
If the approach adopted is that there is no potential territorial sea in play, 
either because the conduct takes place outside twelve nautical miles from any 
rock feature and there is no LTE extension or, because while there is a po-
tential territorial sea, there is no valid or recognized claim to a territorial sea, 
and thus there is no territorial sea, then the legal characterization of the wa-
ters is international waters. That is, the water space where the incident takes 
place would either be high seas within which the high seas freedoms of nav-
igation and overflight apply29 or as an area of a recognized EEZ—of the 
Philippines, for example—within which the high seas freedoms of naviga-
tion and overflight continue to apply, as long as they are exercised with due 
regard for the coastal State’s EEZ rights.30 This approach would also mean—
should it be relevant (on which, see more below)—that the UNCLOS pro-
visions on piracy could also apply. 
The alternative is that the warship’s State recognizes that there is a terri-
torial sea around the feature (potentially also extended by the LTE), which 
                                                                                                                      
29. UNCLOS, supra note 12, art. 87 
1. The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. Freedom of the high 
seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this Convention and by other rules of 
international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and land-locked States: 
(a) freedom of navigation; 
(b) freedom of overflight; 
(c) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to Part VI; 
(d) freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations permitted under in-
ternational law, subject to Part VI; 
(e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in section 2; 
(f) freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII. 
2. These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the interests of other 
States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas, and also with due regard for the 
rights under this Convention with respect to activities in the Area. 
30. Id. art. 58 
1. In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy, subject 
to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article 87 of nav-
igation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other inter-
nationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the 
operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the 
other provisions of this Convention. 
2. Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of international law apply to the exclusive 
economic zone in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part. 
3. In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention in the exclu-
sive economic zone, States shall have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State 
and shall comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State in accordance 
with the provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law in so far as they 
are not incompatible with this Part. 
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must be respected even if the sovereign is unknown. In this case, if the war-
ship were at any time within that territorial sea, then innocent passage would 
be the applicable navigational regime. However, in this particular instance, 
the exercise of innocent passage in the abstract would pose a number of 
second-order practical difficulties. One difficulty that would flow from the 
absence of an identified sovereign over the territorial sea is the inability to 
identify an authority to whom to direct a demarche regarding the hampering 
(by private fishing vessels—on this see below) of the warship’s exercise of 
its right of innocent passage. 
Another issue would be that a piracy analysis of the conduct of the fish-
ing vessels would be complicated. This is because there are two arguments 
available as to the validity of a piracy analysis based on location; however, 
while both arguments draw force from UNCLOS Article 101,31 they arrive 
at diametrically opposed outcomes. The first argument is that because piracy 
takes place in international waters, not territorial seas, there can be no piracy 
in this situation. But there is no (for the warship’s State) recognized sover-
eign, and thus no territorial jurisdiction-linked domestic law as to criminal 
conduct at sea that is immediately applicable in this particular territorial sea. 
This raises an interesting question as to whether the Convention for the Sup-
pression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA 
Convention),32 which can apply in territorial seas, might be available to fill 
the domestic offense creation and definition lacunae that follows from the 
fact that the sovereign is unknown. Alternatively, in the absence of an iden-
tified sovereign with territorially-based priority prescriptive and enforcement 
jurisdiction over that territorial sea, the possibility that the warship’s State—
if it has the requisite extraterritorial jurisdiction and offenses within its do-
mestic law—might exercise its national jurisdiction over the fishing vessels’ 
conduct requires consideration. 
The second argument is to conclude that while there is a territorial sea, 
the fact the sovereign is unknown effectively means that this untethered and 
thus inchoate territorial sea is “a place outside the jurisdiction of any State,”33 
which is separate from the high seas. In this case, the absence of a territorial 
sea jurisdiction would invite Article 101 back into play, allowing a piracy 
analysis to proceed. 
 
                                                                                                                      
31. Id. art. 101. 
32. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation art. 4(1), Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter SUA Convention]. 
33. UNCLOS, supra note 12, art. 101(a)(ii). 
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3. Summary 
 
This brief analysis of the where indicates that the key question of whether or 
not the incident took place in a territorial sea is itself a multipart geographic 
assessment (baselines, parasitic LTEs), which itself requires preliminary re-
course to some fundamentally normative questions (sovereignty and territo-
rial sea claims). Even at this stage, these considerations also invite questions 
as to subsidiary consequences, such as the jurisdictions available in the inci-
dent area. However, in the scenario posed, the issue of where—along with 
its ancillary challenges to jurisdiction—is not unconnected from the issue of 
who, because in terms of legal characterization and analysis, the status of the 
water space and the status of the actor are intertwined. Consequently, it is to 
the who that the assessment now turns. 
 
B. Characterizing the Actors 
 
Accepting the clear sovereign immunity attaching to the NATO warship, the 
scenario poses two types of directly engaged “adversary” protagonists: the 
large steel-hulled vessel and regular fishing vessels. The large steel-hulled 
vessel, of the Sansha City Maritime Militia type,34 or specifically of the Peo-
ple’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM),35 will, in almost all situa-
tions, be considered a government vessel on non-commercial service.36 By 
contrast, the regular fishing vessels appear to vacillate between routine pri-
vate status (in UNCLOS terms, “merchant ship” or “government ship oper-
ated for commercial purposes”37) and some other more State-agent based 
status. This raises the difficult question of the legal characterization of both 
                                                                                                                      
34. Conor M. Kennedy & Andrew S. Erickson, Riding a New Wave of Professionalization 
and Militarization: Sansha City’s Maritime Militia, CIMSEC (Sept. 1, 2016), http://cimsec.org/ 
riding-new-wave-professionalization-militarization-sansha-citys-maritime-militia/27689. 
35. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY FOR DEFENSE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MIL-
ITARY AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
2018, at 72 (2018), https://media.defense.gov/2018/Aug/16/2001955282/-1/-1/1/2018-
CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT.PDF (“People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia 
(PAFMM). The PAFMM is a subset of China’s national militia, an armed reserve force of 
civilians available for mobilization. The PAFMM is the only government-sanctioned mari-
time militia in the world.”). See also id. at 71–72. 
36. UNCLOS, supra note 12, art. 32; U.S. NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS & U.S. COAST 
GUARD, NWP 1-14M/MCTP 11-10B/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE COMMANDER’S 
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS § 2.2.1 (2017). 
37. UNCLOS, supra note 12, pt. II, sec. 3, subsec. B (arts. 27–28). 
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the vessels and the conduct of purportedly ad hoc maritime militia units.38 
Settling upon the status of the fishing vessels used in such a manner—mainly 
engaged in commercial fishing, but also occasionally engaged on harassment 
or presence operations39—is not without significant legal consequences. 
 
1. Status of the (non-PAFMM) Fishing Vessels 
 
While engaged in harassment of the NATO warship, the key question is 
whether the fishing vessels are State vessels or private vessels. If the adopted 
approach is to characterize the fishing vessels engaged in these apparently 
directed harassment operations as State vessels, they will not meet the defi-
nitional requirements for a warship.40 In this case, the only other “State” sta-
tus option is to characterize them as government vessels on non-commercial 
service, given that the harassment operation is clearly State mandated and 
directed. 
However, this approach raises a fundamental complication in that the 
fishing vessels are also still routinely engaged in their commercial function 
as private (merchant) vessels. It is not at all clear that a fishing vessel can 
switch so simply, so often, and for such a short time, between the modes of 
non-sovereign immune private fishing vessel and sovereign immune govern-
ment vessel on non-commercial service. There is no formal and public “re-
badging” or notification involved. And, while there is no international rule 
that is precisely on-point, there is a strong argument that such ad hoc, short-
term, and unnotified changes in mission do not fundamentally alter the char-
acter of the vessel. Accordingly, such vessels remain private vessels, even 
while engaged in these State-directed harassment operations. 
                                                                                                                      
38. Robert McLaughlin, The Legal Status and Characterisation of Maritime Militia Vessels, 
EJIL:TALK! (June 18, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-legal-status-and-characterisat 
ion-of-maritime-militia-vessels/; James Kraska & Michael Monti, The Law of Naval Warfare 
and China’s Maritime Militia, 91 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 450 (2015). 
39. This is one potential characterization of, for example, the June 2019 Reed Bank 
(Recto Bank) incident, where a PRC fishing vessel rammed a Philippines fishing vessel and 
then left the vessel without rendering assistance. See Lucio Blanco Pitlo III, Can the Philippines 
and China Get Past the Reed Bank Debacle?, THE DIPLOMAT (June 29, 2019), https://thediplo-
mat.com/2019/06/can-the-philippines-and-china-get-past-the-reed-bank-debacle/; Regine 
Cabato, Boat Collision in Disputed Waters Tests Chinese-Philippine Relationship, WASHINGTON 
POST, June 13, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/boat-accident-in-disputed-
waters-tests-chinese-philippine-relationship/2019/06/13/2c0170c6-8db4-11e9-b16 2-
8f6f41ec3c04_story.html. 
40. UNCLOS, supra note 12, art. 29. 
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In terms of the law of the sea, the strongest argument in support of the 
view that the fishing vessels remain private vessels is that classification as a 
government vessel on non-commercial service requires that the vessel is used 
only on government non-commercial service.41 There are also other—albeit 
less direct—indicators that the law of the sea disfavors any contention that 
such changes of character between State and private vessel may occur unno-
tified, ad hoc, and for very short periods of time. For example, the idea that 
a merchant vessel should be permitted to switch between flags as a matter 
of simple convenience is antithetical to the scheme of jurisdiction, attribu-
tion, and responsibility enshrined within the law of the sea.42 The idea that a 
fishing vessel might likewise move between State and private characteriza-
tions at whim would seem to be as equally antithetical to these same objec-
tives. 
There are also other arguments to support the conclusion that ad hoc, 
unnotified, and short-term switching between State and private vessel status 
is impermissible. One such argument proceeds from the practice among 
States with auxiliary fleets, for example, the United States and its Military 
Sealift Command,43 or the U.K. practice of, when necessary, employing ships 
taken up from trade, such as the Atlantic Conveyor during the Falklands War.44 
In these situations, the practice of chartering merchant vessels into govern-
ment non-commercial service—with its concomitant possible attachment of 
sovereign immune status—is generally for the minimum period of a voyage 
and, when utilized, requires notification. For example, a Chief of Naval Op-
erations message sets out the U.S. Navy policy for voyage charters: 
 
Limited privileges of sovereign immunity are asserted for MSC US flag 
voyage charters. As a matter of policy, the government ordinarily asserts 
only freedom from arrest and taxation for US flag vessels voyage chartered 
                                                                                                                      
41. Id. art. 96. 
42. Id. arts. 91–92, 94. 
43. About MSC, MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND, https://sealiftcommand.com/about-
msc (last visited Oct. 27, 2020). 
44. Sebastian Roblin, The Royal Navy Turned Two Container Ships into Aircraft Carriers Dur-
ing the Falkland War, NATIONAL INTEREST, June 30, 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/ 
blog/buzz/royal-navy-turned-two-container-ships-aircraft-carriers-during-falkland-war-
64951. 
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by MSC. Masters of these vessels will be advised when the US intends to 
assert full sovereign immunity for them.45 
 
It is also of note—albeit not directly applicable in this scenario—that 
1907 Hague Convention VII sets out detailed rules about change in status 
from merchant vessel to warship, including that such changes must be for-
mally and publicly notified.46 And while Hague VII does not address the is-
sue of high seas conversions (this was too disputed for any consensus at the 
negotiations), the implication of the transfer of a vessel from the merchant 
list to the list of warships is that this necessarily involves a long-term change 
of character and status. 
Consequently, the most legally sound characterization of the fishing ves-
sels in this scenario is that their status as private (merchant) vessels endures, 
regardless of the responsiveness of those fishing vessels to directions to be 
involved in ad hoc State-sanctioned harassment or presence operations. 
However, this conclusion is not without second-order complications. 
The first such complication is whether, during the period of responsive-
ness to State direction and control, the conduct of a private fishing vessel 
outside any recognized territorial sea remains liable to the characterization 
of piracy under the law of the sea. Assuming that all other elements of the 
definition of piracy are met (an act of violence; by a private vessel; against 
another vessel; in the high seas47), the question becomes whether the act was 
(i) “illegal” and (ii) committed for “private ends.” Each requires brief discus-
sion. 
First, an act of piracy requires an illegal act of violence. This begs the 
question as to whether a State-sanctioned and State-directed act of violence 
against another vessel (or, indeed, the cutting and taking—depredation—of 
part of the warship’s “tail”), by a private fishing vessel, is an illegal act. If the 
reference point is the law of the State of nationality of the fishing vessel—
the PRC in this scenario—then the act is unlikely to be illegal given there 
will be a domestic permission or excuse for such conduct built into the per-
petrator’s national law. As Alfred Rubin observed: 
 
                                                                                                                      
45. CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] Washington DC, R 071719Z JUL 16, [U.S.] Sov-
ereign Immunity Policy ¶ 4.b, https://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/reference/mes-
sages/Documents2/NAV2016/NAV16158.txt. 
46. Convention No. VII Relating to the Conversion of Merchant Ships into War-ships 
art. 6, Oct 18, 1907, 205 Consol. T.S. 319. 
47. UNCLOS, supra note 12, art. 101. 
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Read carefully, [the definition of piracy] seems to revive the law of priva-
teering by its reference to “illegal” acts, implying that some depredations 
for private ends might be “legal,” and leaving no explanation of how sense 
is to be made of a purported definition of a “crime” that rests on an unde-
fined and unreferenced concept of prior “illegality”: Illegal under what law? 
By whose determination?48 
 
Sandra Hodgkinson, addressing this same issue, seems to indicate that 
the arbiter of illegality must be something more generally recognized than 
simple domestic exculpatory fiat, stating, “The definition [of piracy] does 
require . . . that the acts be illegal, opening the door to the possibility that a 
legal act of violence or detention (perhaps in self-defense or for some oth-
erwise legally justified reason) would not be an act of piracy.”49 
The correct reference point for defining illegal is not the law of the State 
of nationality of the offending vessel; rather, it is the international law appli-
cable between the concerned States. This is no different than defining a war 
crime under the international law applicable between the concerned States 
rather than each State’s particular formulation of either the offense or avail-
able defenses. In other words, the existence of a domestic authorization to 
commit an international crime does not remove the sting of international 
illegality; it merely renders the domestic jurisdiction unwilling or unable to 
prosecute the offense. This leaves the possibility of a piracy analysis of the 
fishing vessels’ conduct available, but contestable. 
Much more contentious in our scenario is the second challenging defini-
tional requirement of private ends. Much has been written and debated as 
regards the definition of private ends with respect to piracy, and it is fair to 
say that there remains no universally accepted view as to whether an act by 
a private actor for “political purposes” (including environmental purposes) 
nevertheless qualifies as a private end.50 One court put it this way: 
                                                                                                                      
48. Alfred Rubin, “Piracy” in the Twentieth Century, 63 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 
292, 333 (1988) (citation omitted). 
49. Sandra Hodgkinson, The Governing International Law on Maritime Piracy, in PROSECUT-
ING MARITIME PIRACY: DOMESTIC SOLUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 13, 18 (Mi-
chael Scharf, Michael Newton & Milena Sterio eds., 2015). 
50. See, e.g., Arron N. Honniball, Private Political Activists and the International Law Definition 
of Piracy: Acting for ‘Private Ends,’ 36 ADELAIDE LAW REVIEW 279, 328 (2015) (“[A]lthough 
current precedents are insufficient to establish a recognised definition of ‘private ends’ un-
der international law, it is hoped they will be followed and therefore not exclude violent acts 
perpetrated by individuals from effective punishment merely because such actors were mo-
tivated by political goals.”); Douglas Guilfoyle, Political Motivation and Piracy: What History 
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You don’t need a peg leg or an eye patch. When you ram ships; hurl glass 
containers of acid; drag metal-reinforced ropes in the water to damage pro-
pellers and rudders; launch smoke bombs and flares with hooks; and point 
high-powered lasers at other ships, you are, without a doubt, a pirate, no 
matter how high-minded you believe your purpose to be.51 
 
To some extent, this characterization issue hinges on the divergence of 
views on the relevance of the subjective aspects of intention compared with 
the objective fact of agent status. Consequently, debate endures as to 
whether acting for a political purpose, albeit without State sanction, is a pub-
lic or private end. However, if the purpose of the violent acts here was to 
respond to the direction of PRC authorities, then this perhaps takes us fur-
ther than merely personal—albeit altruistic—purpose on the part of the 
crews of the fishing vessels, and places the conduct squarely within the ambit 
of the Nicaragua “effective control”52 or the Tadić “overall control”53 test. 
This would suggest the acts were not for a private end. 
A less legally fraught approach, however, might be to consider the po-
tential liability of the fishing vessels’ more serious conduct as violations of 
                                                                                                                      
Doesn’t Teach Us About Law, EJIL:TALK! (June 17, 2013), https://www.ejiltalk.org/political-
motivation-and-piracy-what-history-doesnt-teach-us-about-law/ 
[I]n law we usually do not contrast the word ‘private’ with the word ‘political’; the usual 
dichotomy employed is between ‘private’ and ‘public’. Precisely why having a political mo-
tivation of the type held by a protest group or terrorist organisation should exempt one 
from the law ordinarily applicable to violence on the high seas has never been satisfactorily 
explained . . . . 
51. Institute of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, 708 F.3d 
1099, 1101 (9th Cir. 2013). 
52. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S), Judg-
ment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶¶ 109–15 (June 27). “For this conduct to give rise to legal re-
sponsibility of the United States, it would in principle have to be proved that that State had 
effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged 
violations were committed.” Id. ¶ 115. 
53. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 117 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) 
States are not allowed on the one hand to act de facto through individuals and on the other 
to disassociate themselves from such conduct when these individuals breach international 
law. The requirement of international law for the attribution to States of acts performed by 
private individuals is that the State exercises control over the individuals. The degree of control 
may, however, vary according to the factual circumstances of each case. 
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the 1988 SUA Convention.54 This is because the Convention does not im-
pute a requirement for private aims to a fishing vessel’s act of violence 
against a warship; it only requires that the conduct be unlawful and inten-
tional.55 Nor does the Convention’s objective excision of State vessels from 
its scope cover the private fishing vessels in this scenario.56 Certainly, the 
issue of unlawfulness—as with piracy—would need to be explored in terms 
of whether State direction of what is otherwise clearly and objectively pro-
scribed private conduct dissolves the illegality. Ostensibly, however, it does 
not. Still, noting that jurisdiction over the offense also potentially resides in 
the warship’s State (which would likely consider the act illegal) via SUA Con-
vention Article 6(2)(b) or (c),57 it is possible to look to the Convention as 
potentially applicable in this scenario. Indeed, as noted in the South China Sea 
Arbitration award, the fact that vessels with sovereign immune status engaged 
in a range of dangerous navigation practices, characterized by reference to 
the COLREGS,58 did not mean that those practices could no longer be char-
acterized as breaches of UNCLOS.59 In this case, the breaches are of Articles 
94(3)(c) and (4)(c) (prevention of collisions) and Article 94(5) (the obligation 
                                                                                                                      
54. For example, “[a]ny person commits an offense if that person unlawfully and in-
tentionally” does any of the following acts: “performs an act of violence against a person 
on board a ship if that act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship” or “destroys 
a ship or causes damage to a ship or to its cargo which is likely to endanger the safe naviga-
tion of that ship.” See SUA Convention, supra note 32, art. 3(1)(b)–(c). Likewise, a person 
that “injures or kills any person, in connection with the commission or the attempted com-
mission of any of the offences set forth [in Article 3(1)]” also commits an offense. See id. 
art. 3(1)(g). 
55. Id. art. 3(1). For a commentary on the mens rea aspect of Article 3, see JAMES KRASKA 
& RAUL PEDROZO, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME SECURITY LAW 806–09 (2013). 
56. SUA Convention, supra note 32, art. 2 
1. This Convention does not apply to: (a) a warship; or (b) a ship owned or operated by a 
State when being used as a naval auxiliary or for customs or police purposes . . . . 2. Nothing 
in this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government ships operated 
for non-commercial purposes. 
57. Id. art. 6(2) (“A State Party may also establish its jurisdiction over any such offence 
when . . . (b) during its commission a national of that State is seized, threatened, injured or 
killed; or (c) it is committed in an attempt to compel that State to do or abstain from doing 
any act.”). 
58. Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, Oct. 
20, 1972, 28 U.S.T. 3459, 1050 U.N.T.S. 16. 
59. South China Sea Arbitration Award, supra note 1, ¶¶ 1081, 1090–1109; see also UN-
CLOS, supra note 12, art. 21(4) (noting that during innocent passage, crews must comply 
with “all generally accepted international regulations relating to the prevention of collisions 
at sea”). The Philippines raised this point during the arbitration. 
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on all vessels to “conform to generally accepted international regulations, 
procedures and practices” related to “ensur[ing] safety at sea”).60 
Finally, the possibility that a private fishing vessel can engage in conduct 
attributable to its State of nationality without necessarily engaging in a paral-
lel transformation in its status from private vessel to State vessel must be 
considered. Article 8 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on 
State Responsibility (ASR)61 clearly anticipates this outcome. Indeed, the 
commentary specifically indicates that an Article 8 attribution of responsibil-
ity for conduct by a private group of individuals acting as a collective (such 
as with a fishing vessel?), to the State that directed that conduct, does not 
transform the private actor(s) into an organ of the directing State: 
 
In such cases it does not matter that the person or persons involved are 
private individuals or whether their conduct involves “governmental activ-
ity.” Most commonly cases of this kind will arise where State organs sup-
plement their own action by recruiting or instigating private persons or 
groups who act as “auxiliaries” while remaining outside the official struc-
ture of the State. These include, for example, individuals or groups of pri-
vate individuals who, not specifically commissioned by the State and not 
forming part of its police or armed forces, are employed as auxiliaries or 
are sent as “volunteers” to neighbouring countries, or who are instructed 
to carry out particular missions abroad.62 
 
ASR Article 8 deals with the attribution of responsibility for conduct by 
a private group to a State in relation to the consequences between States—such 
as for the availability of countermeasures as a remedy. But this attribution 
does not extinguish the concurrent amenability of that private group’s con-
duct to legal assessment schemes that hold “individual” liabilities for private 
actors. The fact that a State sends a private group into a neighboring State to 
commit war crimes, and thus attracts State responsibility for those acts, does 
                                                                                                                      
60. UNCLOS, supra note 12, arts. 94(3)(c), 94(4)(c), and 94(5). 
61. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 53 U.N. GAOR Supp. 
No. 10, art. 8, at 47, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 YEARBOOK OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 47, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) 
[hereinafter Articles on State Responsibility] (“The conduct of a person or group of persons 
shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person or group of persons 
is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in 
carrying out the conduct.”). 
62. Id. at 43, cmt. ¶ 2; see also JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMIS-
SION’S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 
113, ¶ 9 (2002). 
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not alter the fact that the individuals in that private group might still be liable 
to prosecution at (for example) the International Criminal Court for the war 
crimes committed—assuming both jurisdiction and that the ASR Article 8 
responsible State is unwilling or unable to prosecute the group.63 By the same 
path, there is nothing inherent within the SUA Convention that would ren-
der it prima facie inapplicable to the conduct of the private fishing vessels 
and their crews just because—for the purpose of a different accountability 
scheme—that conduct is also attributable to a State. 
With the where and the who of the situation assessed, it is now possible 
to explore the operative significance of the incident as a whole. 
 
C. Assessing the Incident 
 
There are three key points for understanding the operative significance of 
the incident. One, given that the PRC’s claims in this scenario are already 
known, the legitimacy—for the warship’s State—of the warship’s deploy-
ment of a towed array sonar tail and the PAFMM vessel’s riding-off conduct 
is largely dependent upon the warship State’s view regarding the existence of 
a territorial sea. If the warship’s State agrees there is a relevant territorial sea, 
that the warship is operating in those waters, and that the territorial sea must 
be respected—in the abstract, given there is no recognized sovereign—the 
deployment of a tail is ostensibly a breach of innocent passage.64 However, 
even if there is a breach of innocent passage, and even if an inchoate right 
to “require” the warship to depart the territorial sea65 is conceded to the 
PAFMM vessel’s sovereign (the PRC), the conduct of the regular fishing 
vessels concerning the warship is still wrongful. These vessels do not hold 
the maritime law enforcement rights of a government vessel on non-com-
mercial service. Moreover, the taking of a section of the towed array sonar 
tail—which is sovereign immune property66—is clearly a wrongful act. 
By contrast, the large steel hull fishing vessel—the PAFMM vessel—is a 
government vessel on non-commercial service. This then raises the issue of 
                                                                                                                      
63. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 5, 17, 19, 20(3), July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
64. See, e.g., UNCLOS, supra note 12, art. 19(2)(c) or art. 19(2)(f). 
65. Id. art. 30 (“If the warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the 
coastal State concerning passage through the territorial seas . . . and disregards any request 
for compliance therewith . . . the coastal State may require it to leave . . . immediately.”). 
66. See, e.g., Sam LaGrone, China Returns US Navy Unmanned Glider, USNI NEWS (Dec 
20, 2016), https://news.usni.org/2016/12/20/china-returns-u-s-navy-unman ned-glider. 
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what it purported to be the PRC laws and regulations on warship passage 
through the territorial sea and how it purported to “enforce” them.  
First, any claim that the PAFMM vessel is enforcing the PRC’s view on 
the requirement for prior authorization of warship innocent passage67 is un-
likely to be accepted as legitimate by the NATO warship’s State. This might 
be on the basis that the PRC incorrectly interprets the law on innocent pas-
sage. Alternatively, the warship’s State—while recognizing a territorial sea—
may not recognize that it is a PRC territorial sea, and thus hold the view that 
the PRC has no right to enforce its position on innocent passage in this sit-
uation. A claim on the part of the PAFMM vessel to be requiring the “delin-
quent” warship to depart the territorial sea because of a breach of, for exam-
ple, the UNCLOS Article 19(2)(f) prohibition on “launching, landing or tak-
ing on board of any military device”68 would be stronger, but still susceptible 
to questions as to that PRC vessel’s fundamental right to enforce any regu-
lations at all in a territorial sea that the warship’s State does not recognize as 
necessarily being a PRC territorial sea.69 
With regard to the how there is significant State practice on the use of 
force in maritime law enforcement operations.70 This includes practice indi-
cating that riding off is a tolerated maritime law enforcement and maritime 
                                                                                                                      
67. Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of 25 February 1992 (promul-
gated by the Standing Committee, National People’s Congress, Feb. 25, 1992, effective Feb. 
25, 1992) art. 6 (China), https://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONAND TREA-
TIES/PDFFILES/CHN_1992_Law.pdf (“To enter the territorial sea of the People’s Re-
public of China, foreign military ships must obtain permission from the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China.”). 
68. UNCLOS, supra note 12, art. 19(f). 
69. See Rob McLaughlin Authorizations for Maritime Law Enforcement Operations, 98 INTER-
NATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 465 (2016); Patricia Jimenez-Kwast, Maritime Law 
Enforcement and the Use of Force: Reflections on the Categorisation of Forcible Action at Sea in the Light 
of the Guyana/Suriname Award, 13 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 49 (2008). 
70. See, e.g., Robert McLaughlin, Revisiting the Red Crusader Incident, 35 AUSTRALIAN YEAR 
BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 91 (2018). 
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security measure—the Cod Wars,71 Cold War confrontations,72 and the 
Kerch Strait incident73—all provide some indicia of this practice. However, 
by the same token, the warship would be entitled to exercise defensive rights 
in response.74 There is also a separate and differently assessed question as to 
the liability of (i) a situationally illegitimate (for example, the authority to 
regulate is not recognized) or (ii) otherwise legitimate maritime law enforce-
ment or security power (for example, riding off a delinquent warship) to a 
U.N. Charter Article 2(4) use of force characterization. But as noted at the 
outset, that issue is beyond the scope of this brief assessment. 
Two, alternatively, if the warship’s State does not believe that the warship 
is inside a territorial sea, then innocent passage is not relevant, and the pas-
sage must be assessed against the high seas freedoms. The view that there is 
no territorial sea in play may be a result of the conclusion that: 
 
1. Neither Thitu nor Sandy Cay has a recognized sovereign, thus, while 
each is a rock, neither ultimately generate a territorial sea (either in 
conjunction with other features or as separate features) in the ab-
sence of an identified sovereign; or 
2. A potentially relevant territorial sea exists around Thitu or Sandy 
Cay, but the warship is operating outside of these areas. Additionally, 
neither set of rock baselines are within twelve nautical miles of Subi 
and, consequently, neither feature can leverage Subi as a parasitic 
LTE; therefore the warship is not operating within a territorial sea; 
or 
3. A territorial sea exists around Thitu or Sandy Cay, but the warship 
is operating outside of these territorial seas. Furthermore, although 
                                                                                                                      
71. Paddy Johnston, The Cod Wars against Iceland: The Royal Navy as Political Instrument, 
5 CAMBRIDGE REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 9 (1991); Iceland v Britain: The Cod Wars 
Begin—Archive, September 1958, GUARDIAN, Sept. 7, 2018, https://www. theguard-
ian.com/business/from-the-archive-blog/2018/sep/07/first-cod-war-iceland-britain-fish-
1958; Bob Hind, Conflict at Sea during Furious 1970’s Cod Wars, PORTSMOUTH NEWS, June 3, 
2019, https://www.portsmouth.co.uk/retro/conflict-sea-during-furious-1970s-cod-wars-
1314965. 
72. Such as the previously noted Black Sea bumping incident, supra note 9; see generally 
David Winkler, The Evolution and Significance of the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement, 28 JOURNAL 
OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 361 (2005). 
73. Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukr. v. Russ.), Case No. 26, Order of 
May 25, 2019, ¶¶ 46–77, ITLOS Rep., https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/ docu-
ments/cases/case_no_26/C26_Order_25.05.pdf. 
74. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4 (Apr. 9). 
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the warship is within twelve nautical miles of Subi, the warship’s 
State does not subscribe to the view that parasitic LTEs operate to 
extend the territorial sea from mere rocks (as opposed to fully enti-
tled islands). 
 
It follows from this part of the analysis that the warship’s conduct is 
entirely reasonable and in conformity with both high seas freedoms and the 
obligations of safe navigation. The conduct of the PAFMM vessel—a sov-
ereign immune government vessel on non-commercial service—is the con-
duct of an organ of the PRC, for which State responsibility is borne by the 
PRC via ASR Article 4.75 This conclusion then dictates that any further as-
sessment of the PAFMM vessel’s conduct would necessarily hinge around 
the fact that the vessel is sovereign immune (and thus not liable to, for ex-
ample, a piracy or SUA Convention analysis). However, the fact of that ves-
sel’s clear status as an organ of the State means that further analyses of its 
conduct in terms of the legitimacy of its use of force in a purported maritime 
law enforcement context, and in relation to U.N. Charter Article 2(4), are 
both enlivened and warranted. 
Three, based upon the conclusion that the acts by the regular fishing 
vessels against the NATO warship—harassment and damage to warship 
equipment—are acts by private vessels under State direction, then one en-
during character of those acts is as private acts of violence at sea against a 
sovereign immune vessel. Two consequences follow. First, the fact that the 
fishing vessels’ State bears international responsibility, in terms of the law of 
State responsibility, will go to the question of the wrongfulness of the act 
and its characterization. That is, was the act an illegitimate, unfriendly, but 
not internationally wrongful act of purported maritime law enforcement; or 
was it simply an internationally wrongful act. This analysis will then dictate 
the nature of any national remedy, such as retorsion or countermeasures. 
However, the fact of PRC State responsibility does not necessarily im-
munize the private vessels from characterization and liability under other 
equally applicable schemes of assessment. These fishing vessels are not ASR 
Article 4 organs of the State in the same manner as the PAFMM vessel. 
                                                                                                                      
75. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 61, art. 4, at 40 
1. The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international 
law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, what-
ever position it holds in the organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ 
of the central Government or of a territorial unit of the State. 
2. An organ includes any person or entity which has that status in accordance with the 
internal law of the State. 
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Therefore, it would be necessary to explore whether the conduct of these 
vessels was also amenable to analysis of the private nature of their character. 
For example, a piracy analysis might be warranted, although indeterminacy 
around the issues of illegality and private ends will greatly complicate (and 
indeed likely undermine) this process. Alternatively, it may be that the con-
duct is amenable to assessment as a potential SUA Convention offense, not-
ing that State direction is not necessarily fatal to SUA applicability, where the 
vessel is not an exempt vessel within the scheme of that instrument. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
This scenario, dealt with only briefly and selectively in the assessment above, 
implicates a wide array of legal schemes and questions. In this analysis, the 
focus has been upon the interrelationship between the maritime zone, vessel 
status, and characterization of conduct in terms of the law of the sea, with 
secondary reference to potential applicability to relevant international law 
schemes of responsibility. What is hopefully evident from this analysis is that 
the legal assessment of even a simple navigational incident in the South 
China Sea is, in its execution, rarely a simple assessment. 
 
